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Intensity models and transition probabilities for credit card loan delinquencies   
 
 
Abstract 
 
We estimate the probability of delinquency and default for a sample of credit card 
loans using intensity models, via semi-parametric multiplicative hazard models with 
time-varying covariates.  It is the first time these models, previously applied for the 
estimation of rating transitions, are used on retail loans.  Four states are defined in 
this non-homogenous Markov chain: up-to-date, one month in arrears, two months in 
arrears, and default; where transitions between states are affected by individual 
characteristics of the debtor at application and their repayment behaviour since.  
These intensity estimations allow for insights into the factors that affect movements 
towards (and recovery from) delinquency, and into default (or not).  Results indicate 
that different types of debtors behave differently while in different states.  The 
probabilities estimated for each type of transition are then used to make out-of-
sample predictions over a specified period of time.   
 
Keywords: risk analysis, probability of default, intensity modelling, time-varying 
covariates, state space modelling, retail loans 
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1. Introduction 
 
Risk models for retail portfolios of financial institutions, as well as within the 
academic literature, have not been developed as extensively as they have been in 
the corporate sector, mainly due to the availability and inaccessibility of the 
necessary data.  However, with the financial crisis in 2008, awareness and the 
importance of credit risk management have increased, and new insights were 
gained, especially in terms of how correlated loans losses, debtor behaviour and the 
economic climate can be.  In that, there has been work in the corporate sector, 
estimating Probability of Default (PD) and Loss Given Default (LGD) models with the 
inclusion of macroeconomic variables (for example, see Frye (2000a, 2000b) for PD; 
Gupton and Stein (2002, 2005) for LGD), but only recently has this been undertaken 
for retail loan credit models (for example, see Bellotti and Crook (2010), Pennington-
Cross (2003) for PD; Bellotti and Crook (2012), Leow et al. (2011) for LGD).     
 
Using a large dataset of credit card loan accounts provided by a major UK bank, we 
develop intensity models to predict delinquency and default.  Our work differs from 
existing work in a number of ways.  The majority of retail loans PD models currently 
in the literature are of static regression models (see Crook and Bellotti (2010), Leow 
and Mues (2012)), where models predicting default are developed using loan 
application characteristics and are valid only within a specified outcome period, e.g. 
within 12 months of opening.  Such models are also unable to handle accounts that 
are active but have not (yet) experienced any event (known as censoring) or closed, 
so such accounts are usually deleted from the dataset used to develop such models.  
Furthermore, these models are only able to account for time-varying covariates at 
any single snapshot in time yet these indicators essentially change over time, so are 
unable to adequately incorporate the effect of macroeconomic variables.  
Subsequent work has been based on the use of survival models (see Banasik et al. 
(1999), Stepanova and Thomas (2002), Bellotti and Crook (2010)) for default risk, 
which will allow for a more dynamic prediction of events.  Such models will predict 
not just the probability of whether an event will occur (and not limited to a pre-defined 
outcome period), but also the (conditional) probabilities of that event occurring over 
time.  Although survival models can account for different types of events (via 
competing risks), they are based on the assumption that the risk of each event 
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occurring is independent right up to when any event occurs, which might not 
necessarily hold true.  For example, in the months leading up to the default event, 
there would be certain behavioural indicators which take on values to indicate two or 
more missed monthly repayments, and this should mean that the risk of default 
increases more than the risk of early prepayment.  There have also been papers 
suggesting the use of Markov chains (see Ho et al. (2004), Malik and Thomas 
(2012)), and although these have been useful in trying to quantify the behaviour of 
consumers, they have the complication of having to assume stationarity and finding 
the appropriate first, second or third order chain.  We propose the use of intensity 
models to predict for delinquency and default, which have been previously applied to 
the estimation of rating transitions of corporate loans (see Jarrow et al. (1997), Duffie 
et al. (2007),  Lando and Skodeberg (2002)), but have not been used on retail loans 
yet.  Also, other approaches for estimating transition probabilities have been applied 
to corporate loans, for example the standard unobserved latent factor model and 
Bayesian methods (see for example Stefanescu (2009) and Kadam and Lenk (2008) 
but in these papers only aggregated data was used. 
 
In this work, we do not just focus on the prediction of default.  Instead, using both 
application and behavioural variables, we model time to delinquency, and then to 
default, based on how debtors have behaved throughout their loan period as well as 
how they might have handled previous experiences of periods in arrears.  As such, 
we use an alternative definition of default here: three months of missed payments, 
but not necessarily consecutive; instead of the conventional one of defining default to 
occur when the debtor has missed three consecutive months (or 90 days’ worth) of 
payments (The Financial Services Authority (2009), BIPRU 4.3.56 and 4.6.20).  This 
then allows us to define four states chronicling the progression from up-to-date to 
default (to be defined in the following section), as well as when accounts move 
towards (or away) from default.  Credit card accounts are tracked over a period of 
time where transitions between the various states could be affected by the individual 
characteristics of the debtor at time of application and how the debtor has managed 
their finances since gaining the credit account.  Other external factors, like 
macroeconomic variables, could also be included but are not considered in this work.  
Each possible transition in this intensity model is modelled separately via a semi-
parametric multiplicative hazard model with time-varying covariates (see Andersen et 
 4 
al. (1993; 1991)), which are then calibrated to get the probabilities of moving (or 
staying) between states.  Although this methodology has been detailed in a number 
of academic papers including Andersen et al. (1991), Jarrow et al. (1997) , Lando 
and Skodeberg (2002) and Berd (2005) among others, they focus mainly on the 
estimation of parameter estimates, and where predictions were done, they were only 
in the time-homogenous case.  The models we advance allow one to estimate a 
complete matrix of transition probabilities between any two repayment states 
between any two duration time periods for each case (in our application each 
account). By applying cut-offs they allow the prediction of the numbers of cases (in a 
sample) that would be expected to transit from one repayment state in one time 
period to any other state in any other time period the analyst may choose. 
 
The models have several important advantages over cross-section regression 
models and over survival models. Compared with the former, the user can gain 
predictions of the probability of moving between states in any future time period, not 
just the time period chosen at the time of model estimation. Also, time varying 
covariates can be incorporated. Compared with simple survival models, intensity 
models give many additional types of predictions, for example predictions of entire 
transition probability matrices in any future time period for each borrower, rather than 
merely the hazard probability of default occurring in any specified duration time. 
 
Intensity models have several potential uses by practitioners in financial institutions. 
First, since intensity models allow the predictions of transition probability matrices in 
any future time period, they would be crucially useful to the computation of a 
financial institution’s economic capital in any future time period. Second, by 
developing a model that can predict the different states of delinquency, not only are 
we be able to get predictions for default over time, we are also be able to get more 
intricate predictions for each state of delinquency leading up to default.  This would 
enable a lender to attain insights into the factors that affect movements towards, and 
recovery from, delinquencies, as well as factors contributing towards a move from 
delinquency into default. So a lender could identify those types of borrowers that are 
likely to progress to default, those likely to progress to merely two or just one 
payment in arrears and also those likely to recover from being in arrears. The 
models also allow the identification of when each borrower who is in arrears is likely 
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to recover. Third, although we do not go into detail here, this work could also be 
used by a lender to predict default risk in low- or zero-default portfolios.  The analysis 
conducted on a low-default portfolio could underestimate default risk, but this might 
be mitigated by taking into account, by using the models we advance, the episodes 
where accounts go into arrears but not default.   
 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: The data and notation are described in 
section 2.  Section 3 describes the methodology, and Sections 4 and 5 detail results 
and predictions respectively.  Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Data and definitions 
 
Data was supplied by a major UK bank and were active credit card accounts from all 
parts of the UK.  This large dataset of more than 49,000 unique accounts is a 
random sample of credit cards that were issued from January 2002 up to June 2005, 
as well as their monthly histories since the account was opened, up to June 2006 or 
the time at which the credit card account was closed, whichever is earlier.  Accounts 
that were still active in June 2006 are said to be censored at that time.  As part of 
pre-processing, accounts that do not have consecutive monthly observations were 
removed, as well as accounts where their history did not start from the time the credit 
card was issued.  Account and debtor characteristics available are common 
application variables, including type of employment, length of time the debtor had 
been with the bank, time at address and age; and behavioural variables available on 
a monthly basis, including spending and repayment amounts, credit limit and 
outstanding balance.   
 
From accounts that were active during the period of May 2005 to June 2006, a 
random sample of unique accounts (20%), as well as all their respective monthly 
observations, were selected and kept separate as the validation sample.  All other 
accounts were included in the training sample.  Thus, the training and validation sets 
are kept completely separate.   
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2.1. Minimum repayment amount 
 
A minimum repayment amount is required for the assignment of states but this 
information was not directly available from the provider of the data.  We define τ  as 
duration time since an account was opened and we define the minimum repayment 
amount in duration month τ , τM , to be the higher of 1% of the outstanding balance 
in month 1−τ  or £5.  It is possible for the minimum repayment amount to be £0, if 
there is zero outstanding balance on the account.  Also, if the account is in credit, the 
minimum repayment amount required is also defined to be £0.   
 
2.2. Definition of states 
 
Four states are defined: state 0 means that the account is up to date; states 1 to 3 
mean that the account is in one, two and three months in arrears, respectively.  Note 
that these months in arrears do not necessarily have to be consecutive.  State 3 is 
also known as the default state, so any account that enters state 3 is said to have 
entered default.  For the purpose of this work, the default state is defined to be an 
absorbing state (i.e. accounts that enter the default state will not leave).  States and 
movements between states are assigned as follows.  Let Mτ denote the minimum 
repayment required from the statement from month τ, and let Pτ denote the 
repayment amount in month τ. 
• All accounts start in state 0, where the account is said to have an up to date 
repayment schedule.   
• At any time during the observation period, if repayment amount, τP , is less 
than the minimum, τM , required, the debtor shall advance into the next 
immediate state (e.g. if the account is in state 0 in month 1−τ , and failed to 
meet the minimum repayment amount in month τ , it will be said to have 
moved to state 1 in month τ ).   
• A debtor who has missed a repayment before (i.e. either already in state 1 or 
2) but manages to make some repayment amount, τP , in the following 
month(s) shall remain in that state if the repayment amount meets the 
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minimum repayment amount1, i.e. 1−+<< ττττ MMPM ; or be moved to one 
lower state if the repayment amount meets the sum total of the minimum 
amount of the current and previous month but not the previous month’s 
outstanding balance, 1−τB , i.e. 11 −− <<+ ττττ BPMM ; or be moved to state 0 if 
the repayment amount is larger than the previous month’s outstanding 
balance, i.e. 1−> ττ BP . 
 
Figure 1: Observed transitions of three randomly selected accounts, A, B and C, 
from bottom to top.  
 
 
As such, it is not possible for any account to advance more than one state at any 
one time interval, but it is possible for accounts to drop more than one state (e.g. a 
debtor who is in state 2 and manages to repay his loan fully will be said to move from 
state 2 to state 0 in that month).  Figure 1 displays the observed transitions of three 
example accounts, over the duration time of each loan: account A (in the bottom 
                                                 
1 It is possible that the payment the debtor missed (and hence moved states) is not the previous immediate 
month, so it would not be fair to look at the previous month’s repayment amount to decide if the debtor will move 
to a lower state.  For example, let’s say the minimum repayments (and actual payment amounts and state) of 
months 4 and 5 are £56 (£0, move from state 0 to state 1) and £84 (£84, remain in state 1) respectively.  In 
month 6, the minimum payment is £62 and the debtor makes a payment amount of £120.  Although this amount 
should be enough to cover the minimum repayment of the missed payment in month 4 (£62+£56 < £120) and 
allow the debtor to move out of state 1 back to state 0, under our definitions, the debtor would have to repay at 
least the sum total of this and the previous month’s minimum payment (i.e. £62+£84=£146) before he is said to 
move out of state 1 into state 0. 
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panel) went into state 1 twice before quickly going into default by month 16; accounts 
B and C (in the middle and top panels, respectively) did go into arrears but 
recovered, and both were up to date at the end of the sample period.   
 
2.3. Distribution of default 
 
The calculation of minimum repayment amount, the threshold for transition between 
states, and hence the transition to default, are defined in this work independent of 
the data provider.  Also, the definition of default adopted here is such that an account 
is said to go into default once it goes three (not necessarily consecutive) months in 
arrears, so is not the conventional definition of default.  The default rate at each time 
τ  is then calculated as the number of accounts that go into default, at time τ  as a 
proportion of the total number of active accounts, at time τ .  Figure 2 gives an 
empirical distribution of this rate as observed in the training set, and we see that it is 
highest nearer the start of the loan and decreases with the age of the loan.     
 
Figure 2: Distribution of defaults over time, based on training set. 
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3. Methodology 
 
Before going into the details of the methodology, we note the issue of continuous 
and discrete time.  One advantage of intensity models is the fact that they can be 
estimated in continuous time, however, given that the data we have are in monthly 
observations, and that we have a large dataset, we decide to approximate this to 
discrete time.  The adjustment for continuous to discrete time is based on that 
described in Chen et al. (2005), but not always necessary if the dataset is large 
enough such that at least one event occurs at any given time or if the number of time 
periods under consideration is large. 
 
The final output of the intensity model is the matrix of transition probabilities, ( )tsi ,P , 
where s and t are specific realisations of τ .  The matrix of transition probabilities will, 
given an account’s covariates, give the probabilities of transitions between each pair 
of states over a specified time period, s to t.  In order to get this transition matrix, two 
other components have to be estimated: the transition intensity, which reflect the rate 
of change in the number of accounts between each pair of states at each time and 
are therefore both state and time dependent; and the time-dependent generator 
matrix, which is estimated via the cumulation of transition intensities up to time t.  We 
note that in the case where there is time and account homogeneity, the estimation of 
the transition intensity, generator matrix and transition matrix can be estimated via 
the matrix exponential.  However, this is not the case here so this model has to be 
estimated using a different method.  These are further detailed below.   
 
Following Andersen et al. (1991) and Lando and Skodeberg (2002), we let any 
individual i, ni ,,1= , moving from state h to state j, jhjh ≠= ;30,  , be represented 
by a vector of m covariates, ( )τiΖ , consisting of time-independent covariates 
(application variables) and time-dependent covariates (behavioural variables)2.  The 
transition intensity between states, hjiα , is then defined as in Equation 1.   
 
 
                                                 
2 Note that ( )τiΖ  could be more specifically written as ( )τhjiΖ , which would be specific to each particular h to j 
transition, but is not necessary in this work because the time-dependent variables are not state-specific.   
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }τταττα iThjhjhihji Y Zβexp0=      (1) 
where ( )τhiY  is an indicator for whether individual i was in state h at time τ , 0hjα is 
the baseline transition intensity for state h to state j and hjβ  is a vector of unknown 
regression coefficients for the m covariates.   
 
We estimate hjβ  by hjβˆ , by maximising the generalised Cox partial likelihood (see 
Cox (1972) and Andersen et al. (1993), Section VII), given in Equation 2. 
( ) ( )
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where r(.) is some function to be defined, ( ) ( )( ) ( )[ ]∑=
n
i
hihji
T
hj YrS τττβ Ζβ,
0  and 
( ) ( ) ( ){ }11 =−−Ι=∆ τττ hjihjihji NNN , ( ) =τhjiN number of observed transitions from state h 
to j by individual i over time τ . 
 
We define function r(.) to be the exponential function, following Cox (1972) and 
Lando and Skodeberg (2002), and taking the logarithm of it, get Equation 3. 
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Where ( ) ( )( )∑= n
i
i
T
hjhihjhj YS ττ Ζββ exp,
0 . 
 
The maximisation of the partial likelihood of Equation 3 will give values for hjβˆ  and 
estimates for hjβ , which can then be used to calculate the baseline transition 
intensities, ( ) ( )∫=
τ
ατ
0
00
ˆ duuA hjhj .  These are estimated by the Nelson-Aalen type 
estimators and are given in Equation 4 (slightly altered because we have ties for 
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event times, see Keiding and Andersen (1989), Aalen et al. (2008), Chapter 4, and 
Borgan (1997)). 
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )
( )∑
∫
≅
=
τ
τ
τ
0
0
0
00
,ˆ
,ˆ
,ˆ
uS
uD
udN
uS
uJ
A
hjhj
hj
hj
hjhj
h
hjhj
β
β
β
     (4) 
Where ( ) { }01 >++Ι= hnhh YYuJ  ,  ( ) =uDhj Number of type h to j transitions at time u, 
and ( ) ( )( )∑= n
i
i
T
hjhihjhj uYuS Ζββ exp,ˆ
0 , for jhjh ≠= ;30,  . 
 
In order to get the transitions probabilities, the generator matrix has to be defined.  A 
generator matrix, A , consists of the following elements.    
( )( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) jhuuuY
duuA
ihjhjhi
hjiihjhji
≠≅
=
∑
∫
τ
τ
α
αττ
0
0
0
ˆexp
,ˆ;ˆ
Zβ
Zβ
  (5) 
( )( ) ( ) 30ˆ,ˆ;ˆ =−= ∑
≠
hAA
jh
hjiihjhhi τττ Zβ   (6) 
 
Equation 5 cumulates the intensities of experiencing event hj up to each time τ , and 
the latter cumulates the intensities for any of the possible events. 
 
The probabilities of transition from time s to t, for each individual i, ( )( )τhjitsP Z,, , 
given ( )τhjiΖ , can be calculated by the product integral given in Equation 7.  For 
simplicity, we rewrite ( )( )τhjits ZP ,,  as ( )tsi ,P . 
( ) ( )( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )( )∏
∏
−−−+Ι=
+Ι=
],(
],(
1;1ˆ;ˆ
;ˆ,ˆ
ts
iiii
ts
iii
uuuu
uudts
ZAZA
ZAP
   (7) 
 
These transition matrices, which are specific to individuals, would give the probability 
of an account being in each state at time t, given the state it was in at time s.  In the 
case of our dataset, where account observations are available monthly, we say that 
the probability of a transition at any time t is ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )1;1ˆ;ˆˆ −−−+Ι= ttttt hjiihjiii ZAZAP . 
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4. Results 
 
The intensities of six different transitions that are observed in the dataset are 
estimated here: from state 0 to 1, from state 1 to 2, from state 1 to 0, from state 2 to 
3, from state 2 to 1 and from state 2 to 0.  The final variables and their explanations 
included in the models are given in Table 1.  Due to data confidentiality agreements, 
not all variables can be named.  
 
 4.1. Model parameter estimates 
 
The covariates included in each transition model are kept the same for all the 
transitions, which would allow for some comparison of the effects of each covariate 
on the different transition types.  For comparison purposes, only the parameter 
estimate signs are included and signs for all intensity models are listed in a single 
table, Table 1.  The asterisks represent statistical insignificance at 0.05.  From 
previous work (e.g. see Bellotti and Crook (2012)), we might have certain 
expectations of different types of debtors, for example, those employed would be 
expected to be most reliable, and younger debtors aged below 25 might be 
considered more risky than those in their 30s.  However, it is with interest that we 
note that these prior expectations do not necessarily hold here, and that the effects 
of some covariates vary depending on the state the individual is in.  
 
Most of the application variables have parameter estimate signs that behave 
consistently with previous literature (see Avery et al. (2004)), for example, a debtor 
that has been with the bank a longer time seem to have a lower chance of 
delinquency, and a higher chance of moving towards recovery; home owners are 
less likely to be delinquent and more likely to recovery should they go into 
delinquency.  But there are interesting insights in two key application variables 
commonly used in scoring models: age and employment status.  Age at application 
was divided into a number of groups with those 21 years old and below as the base 
category.  Generally, it is observed that debtors in the older categories are less likely 
to move into states of delinquency and more likely to move out of delinquency, as 
compared to the base category.  The exception is when debtors are already two 
months in arrears (state 2) here, younger debtors are less likely to actually default 
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(move from state 2 to 3), and more likely to move out of state 2.  This might be 
because these debtors are able to eventually turn to their family for help.  For 
employment status, those who are employed are fixed as the base category, which 
could be regarded as the preferred debtor due to the stability of income.  Those that 
are self-employed or unemployed are more likely to go into states 1 and 2 (arrears), 
but not necessarily default.  When looking at recovery from delinquency, the model 
implies that debtors that are employed are in fact less likely to recover, especially 
from state 2.   We theorise that those that are self-employed or unemployed are 
probably used to struggling with their finances and therefore more adept at balancing 
their accounts, whereas those that are employed and who go into arrears are likely 
to have encountered an unforeseen situation and thus likely to slide into default 
quickly.    
 
The time-dependent behavioural variables are lagged, so are known at time of 
prediction.  They behave intuitively, for example, the higher the proportion of his/her 
available credit drawn, which could be an indicator of poor finances, the more likely 
the debtor will go into delinquency.  Of interest is a variable representing the rate of 
transitions (RJT3), which could be an indication of the credibility of the debtor.  It is 
observed that the higher the rate of jumps, the more likely the debtor will go into 
delinquency (i.e. states 1 or 2) but not default (i.e. state 3).  This again implies that 
debtors who frequently go into delinquency (those that are used to struggling with 
their finances) seem to be able to balance their finances better.  Also, the higher the 
rate of transitions, the less likely debtors are to make full recoveries (i.e. from state 1 
to 0, or state 2 to 0) but more likely to make some payment that will move  them to a 
lower state of delinquency (i.e. state 2 to state 1). 
 
To check for model fit, martingale residuals could be computed, but with the 
inclusion of time-dependent covariates, the underlying assumptions of the residual 
calculations no longer hold.  Therefore, we validate the model by comparing the 
number of predicted and observed transitions, as detailed in Section 5.2. 
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Table 1.  Parameter estimate signs for the intensity models of different types of 
transitions.  The asterisk represents a statistical insignificance at 0.05.   
Code Explanation Towards delinquency Towards recovery 
0 to 1 1 to 2 2 to 3 1 to 0 2 to 1 2 to 0 
NOCA Number of cards at application - +* + - - + 
LAND Indicator for presence of landline - - - + + +* 
TADD Time at address, in years + - - + + +* 
TWBA Time with Bank, in months - - - + + + 
TWBM Indicator for missing Time with Bank - - - + + + 
INCL Income, Ln - + + - - +* 
INCM Indicator for missing income - + + - - + 
A1 Variable A Group 1 . . . . . . 
A2 Variable A Group 2 + + + - - - 
A3 Variable A Group 3 + + + - - - 
A4 Variable A Group 4 + + + - - - 
A5 Variable A Group 5 + + + - - - 
AGE1 Age at application, group 1 . . . . . . 
AGE2 Age at application, group 2 - - + +* - - 
AGE3 Age at application, group 3 - - + + - - 
AGE4 Age at application, group 4 - - + + -* - 
AGE5 Age at application, group 5 - - + + - - 
AGE6 Age at application, group 6 - - + + - - 
AGE7 Age at application, group 7 - - + + - - 
AGE8 Age at application, group 8 - - + + - - 
AGE9 Age at application, group 9 - - + + - -* 
AGE10 Age at application, group 10 - - + + - +* 
EEMP Employment Group: Employed . . . . . . 
ESEL Employment Group: Self-employed + + +* - + -* 
ENOT Employment Group: Not employed - +* +* -* -* + 
EUNE Employment Group: Unemployed + + -* + + +* 
CLI3 Credit limit, ln, lagged 3 months +* - - + + + 
PAY3 Payment amount, ln, lagged 3 months + + - + +* +* 
PDR3 Proportion of credit drawn, lagged 3 
months 
+ + + - + - 
RJT3 Rate of total jumped, lagged 3 months + + - - + - 
RSD3 Indicator for improvement in state from 3 
months previous, lagged 3 months 
+ + -* - +* + 
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4.2. Baseline intensity 
 
The baseline intensity was calculated via Equation 4 for all the transitions.  In order 
to make comparisons, we overlay the graphs for the transitions in which the 
underlying risk sets are common, for example, an account currently in state 1 could 
move to state 0 or move to state 2, so transitions from 1 to 2 and 1 to 0 would have a 
common risk set.  Figures 3 to 5 represent the baseline intensities for transitions 
from states 0, 1 and 2 respectively.  All three figures have graphs that start from 
month 4 because a three-month lag is applied for the behavioural variables. 
 
Figure 3. Baseline intensity for transition from state 0 to state 1. 
 
 
In Figure 3, we see the baseline intensity for transition from state 0 to 1 is highest 
near the beginning of the loan, which could represent accounts or debtors who were 
struggling with debt and go into delinquency soon after the credit card account is 
approved.  The intensity then tapers off and remains quite stable throughout the 
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period of the loan, which would represent a small percentage of debtors who 
occasionally miss a payment unintentionally. 
 
Figure 4. Baseline intensity for transitions from state 1.  The stars represent the 
baseline transition intensity from state 1 to state 2; the squares represent the 
baseline transition intensity from state 1 to state 0.  
 
 
Figure 4 displays the baseline intensity of two transitions, both transitions from state 
1, to either state 0 or state 2.  We observe that the transition intensity of state 1 to 0 
is higher than the transition intensity of state 1 to 2; in other words, for accounts that 
are in state 1, there is a higher probability of moving towards recovery (state 0) than 
of moving towards further delinquency (state 2).  Also, the transition intensity to state 
2 is higher at the beginning of the loan, which implies that some debtors struggle 
from the very beginning and so go from state 1 to state 2 in a short period.  With the 
exception of the couple of months near the beginning of the loan, transition 
intensities from state 1 are relatively flat throughout the duration of the loan.   
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Figure 5. Baseline intensity for transitions from state 2.  The stars represent the 
baseline intensity from state 2 to state 3; the squares represent the baseline intensity 
from state 2 to state 1; the triangles represent the baseline intensity from state 2 to 
state 0. 
 
 
Figure 5 displays the baseline intensities of transitions from state 2.  The transition 
intensity from state 2 to state 3 is highest, followed by that to state 1, and transition 
intensity from state 2 to state 0 is lowest.  This would mean that, contrary to what 
was observed in the previous graph on transitions from state 1, debtors that are in 
state 2 are more likely to go into default (state 3) than to make some recovery (state 
1), and have an even lower chance of making full recovery (state 0).    
 
5. Predictions 
 
This model was developed such that, given the covariates of an individual account at 
any particular time, a matrix of transition probabilities of moving between states can 
be computed for any specified time period up to the length of lag of the behavioural 
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variables3.  Two kinds of predictions are made here in order to first, get an insight of 
how the model would predict for accounts with different characteristics, and second, 
to validate the model using predictions.    
 
5.1. Insights based on employment type 
 
An example account for each employment type is created.  The application variables 
are the mean (median or mode where appropriate) values of the accounts in each 
employment category from the training set.  The behavioural variables at each time 
point are the mean (or mode) values of all active accounts at that time point.  We 
limit the prediction time period to a 6 month period, 6 months after the account was 
opened4, i.e. the probabilities of transiting or staying in certain states at the end of 
month 12, given that the account was in a certain state in month 6.  These matrices 
are given below.   
Employed (6, 12) = 












1000
4841.00398.00843.03917.0
0602.00267.01294.07835.0
0098.00154.01228.08518.0
 
Self employed (6, 12) = 












1000
3237.00345.00990.05426.0
0343.00201.01193.08261.0
0054.00119.01118.08707.0
 
Unemployed (6, 12) = 












1000
4110.00370.00907.04611.0
0397.00197.01247.08157.0
0072.00125.01218.08583.0
 
Not employed (6, 12) = 












1000
4437.00395.00958.04207.0
0555.00264.01375.07803.0
0108.00175.01352.08364.0
 
 
                                                 
3 Predictions further into the future can be made by first forecasting the values of behavioural variables. 
4 Prediction is done from six months because the observations from the first three months are not reliable across 
all observations, and because there is a 3-month lag for the behavioural variables. 
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A few of observations are made.  If the account is originally in state 0, there is very 
high chance (above 80%) that it will still be in state 0 in month 12.  Note that this 
does not necessarily mean that it is in state 0 for the entire 6 month period, it could 
have moved out of state 0 and then back in again.  The chance of it being in state 1, 
2 or 3 at month 12 decreases appropriately and this applies for all employment 
types.  If the account is originally in state 1, there is a high chance (around 80% but 
lower than if it were in state 0, ranging from 78% to 82%) that it will have gone to 
state 0 by month 12.  The next highest probability would be to stay in state 1.  
However, the probability of being in state 3 at month 12 is higher than the probability 
of being in state 2.  This seems to suggest that for an account in delinquency, there 
is a high chance it will recover (back to 0), there is also a chance that it will just 
remain in state 1 but in the case where it is going to go bad, it is more likely to move 
to state 3 (default), then to be hanging on in state 2.  If the account is originally in 
state 2, there is very low chance it will be in state 1 or 2 at month 12, and roughly the 
same chance of the account being in state 0 (full recovery) and in state 3 (default).  
The probabilities are different for the different employment types.  For employment, 
there is a higher chance of being in default (48%) than recovery (39%); for self 
employed, a higher chance to be in recovery (54%) than in default (32%) and the 
difference in the two probabilities is much bigger than that seen for the employed; for 
unemployed, roughly the same at 43% either way; for not employed, higher chance 
of recovery (46%) than default (41%), but the difference in probabilities is not as 
great as for the self-employed.  This seems to suggest that the self-employed, 
unemployed and not employed are used to struggling with balancing their finances 
and have a good chance of recovery, whereas for the employed people, they are 
likely to go into disaster mode. 
 
5.2. Validation of test set 
 
There are over 40,000 unique accounts in the test set that have at least six months’ 
observations, for which we have application variables, monthly behavioural variables 
up to the time the account is closed or June 2006, whichever is earlier, including the 
state in which the account is in at each time point.   
 
 
 20 
5.2.1. Test framework 
 
The six transition models developed are applied to all accounts in the test set, from 
which the individual-specific transition matrices, ( )tsi ,P , are computed for time period 
s to t, the format of which is given in Equation 8.  Although it is possible to get 
probabilities of transitions for any time point, it is necessary to define a period of time 
s to t in our work, so as to enable the comparison of the predicted state at time t with 
that of the actual state each account is in.  In this work, we find the transition matrix 
for time 6 to 12, i.e. given states of accounts at time 6, to predict its state at time 12.   
( )












=
1000
,
23222120
13121110
03020100
pppp
pppp
pppp
tsiP      (8) 
 
In order to predict whether a transition has taken place, we compare predicted 
transition probabilities to cut-off values, which will be different for the different 
transitions.  The cut-off value for each type of transition, hjc , is computed such that 
the proportion of accounts predicted to undergo transition hj in the test set is equal to 
the proportion of accounts that undergo transition hj in the training set.  However, 
because some accounts start less than 12 months before the end of our sample 
period, their states are unknown at time 12, and although it is possible to identify and 
remove these accounts from the test and training sets, these accounts are not 
usually known at the time of prediction.  Note that predictions can still be made for 
these accounts, but how these accounts are handled will affect the proportion of 
observed transitions and hence the cut-off values.  One way to handle this would be 
to remove accounts that have states unknown at time 12, so that these would not 
impact cut-off values and performance measures, known as scenario A.  As a test of 
robustness, we consider two further scenarios: (B) let the state of the accounts at 
time 12 be the initial state of the account, i.e. at time 6; and (C) let the state of the 
accounts at time 12 be the state each account was last observed in.  Each scenario 
will produce a different number of transitions and different cut-off values.  Given the 
observed state of each account at time 6 and the probabilities from the transition 
matrix, the predicted state of account i at time 12, is given by equation 9.   
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The order of which the states are compared affects the predictions because the 
states are competing states, i.e. an account predicted to go into the first state 
compared, would not be considered for transition into the rest of the states.  For 
example, by comparing the probabilities and cut-off values of transition 1hj  before 
transition 2hj , we place an additional (and random) chance of transition to state 1j  
over state 2j  because should a transition to state 1j  happen, the account is no 
longer at risk for a transition to state 2j .  By assigning one state before another, we 
implicitly place a higher chance of transition on the first state, which is debatable as 
an equally compelling reason could be found for a different order.  In this work, we 
rank states based on the training set, in ascending order of number of transitions, 
and compare probabilities in that order5.  Note that this ordering could be different for 
different states as well as for the different scenarios.     
( ) ( )( )







>≤≤
>≤
>
==
otherwise
 and  and  if
 and  if
 if
state|state predict
4
3
2
1
332211
221
11
j
cpcpcpj
cpcpj
cpj
hst
hjhjhjhjhjhj
hjhjhjhj
hjhj
ii
i   (9) 
Where states 1j  to 4j  represent states 0 to 3. 
 
5.2.2. Performance measures 
 
With more than two states defined in this work, the usual predictive analytics 
performance measures cannot be applied here.  For each scenario, the predicted 
states are then compared against the observed states at time t, and three different 
performance measures are computed.  The first is the cohort level accuracy table, 
which gives the overall number of accounts predicted to be in each state at time 12 
(columns), given the number of accounts in each state at time 6 (rows).  Due to 
confidentiality agreements with the data provider, the actual numbers cannot be 
reported, and each cell is calculated to be the ratio 
stransition  observed of number
stransition  predicted of number
hj
hj .  
As such, a value greater than 1 would mean that the number of predicted hj 
transitions are greater than the number of observed hj transitions, i.e. the number of 
accounts predicted to make this particular transition has been over-estimated.  
                                                 
5 An alternative ranking of states was considered with similar results and performance measures. 
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Similarly, a value less than 1 would imply that the number of accounts predicted to 
make this particular transition has been under-estimated.  The ratio itself will also 
give an indication of how far off the predictions are, for example a value of 2 would 
that the number of predicted transitions is double what is observed.  From Table 2, 
we see that overall predicted numbers are quite close to what was observed, and the 
model tends to over-estimate the number of accounts going into delinquencies; and 
in the case of defaults, these numbers are very much over-estimated.  For example, 
from accounts that were in state 2 at time 6 (scenario A), the model predicts 11 times 
the number of accounts that will default (state 3), and only a third of the number of 
accounts that made a full recovery (state 0) by month 12.  When accounts with 
states unknown at time 12 are included in the predictions (scenarios B and C), we 
see that while the ratios in the other cells remain similar to the ratios in scenario A, 
the ratios of defaults increases further, maintaining the conservative predictions.   
 
Next is the account level confusion table, where the rows and columns of this table 
give the numbers of observed and predicted accounts for each state at time 12, 
respectively, and the proportion of states that are actually correctly predicted.  As 
before, it is not possible to report actual numbers, and cells are divided by different 
sums in order to conceal the actual delinquency and default rates.  The diagonal 
cells (in bold) of each panel in Table 3 give the sensitivity of each state, representing 
the proportion of accounts that have their states at time 12 correctly predicted.  
These ratios show that the model is able to distinguish between delinquent and non-
delinquent accounts well, with an accuracy percentage of above 91% for state 0 
predictions.  However, it is less successful at differentiating between delinquent 
states, with accuracy percentages of 15% to 20% for state 3 predictions.  The non-
diagonal cells represent the proportion of accounts that are wrongly predicted, and 
calculated to be the ratio 
j
jh
 state in be to predicted accounts of number total
 state in be to predicted but  state in accounts of number .  The 
cells above the diagonals represent accounts that have been predicted to be in a 
state worse than it actually is, while those below the diagonals represent accounts 
that have been predicted to be in a better state.  The difference in the ratios in these 
two groups of cells are striking, which show that, where the model gets the 
predictions wrong, it is conservatively skewed, with the majority of wrong predictions 
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to be in a state higher than they actually are.  This result holds across the different 
scenarios.   
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Table 2: Cohort level accuracy table.  
  Predicted at time 12 
  (A) Unknowns left as is (B) Unknowns as initial state (C) Unknowns as last known state 
  State 0 State 1 State 2 State 3 State 0 State 1 State 2 State 3 State 0 State 1 State 2 State 3 
O
bs
er
ve
d 
at
 ti
m
e 
6 
State 0 1.004 0.696 2.132 12.829 0.998 0.751 2.229 13.610 1.004 0.713 2.178 13.268 
State 1 0.907 0.614 1.563 20.036 1.004 0.569 1.676 21.571 0.919 0.651 1.432 21.107 
State 2 0.365 0.327 0.647 11.600 0.397 0.347 0.404 12.800 0.377 0.351 0.500 12.933 
State 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Table 3: Account level confusion table. 
  Predicted at time 12 
  (A) Unknowns left as is (B) Unknowns as initial state (C) Unknowns as last known state 
  State 0 State 1 State 2 State 3 State 0 State 1 State 2 State 3 State 0 State 1 State 2 State 3 
O
bs
er
ve
d 
at
 ti
m
e 
12
 
State 0 0.910 0.798 0.749 0.780 0.914 0.773 0.741 0.747 0.913 0.804 0.740 0.777 
State 1 0.078 0.117 0.173 0.173 0.077 0.138 0.175 0.196 0.076 0.117 0.180 0.171 
State 2 0.005 0.024 0.076 0.034 0.004 0.020 0.083 0.047 0.005 0.024 0.085 0.040 
State 3 0.001 0.004 0.038 0.202 0.001 0.005 0.039 0.155 0.001 0.004 0.034 0.190 
 25 
Finally, we tabulate some overall statistics, one of which is the accuracy percentage, 
which will give the percentage of accounts with correctly predicted states at time 12.  
We also calculate the proportion of accounts that have been predicted to be in a state 
worse than it should be, i.e. the model is being conservative; and correspondingly, the 
proportion of accounts that have been predicted to be in a state better than it should 
be, i.e. the model is being too optimistic.  These are given in Table 4, for all three 
scenarios. 
 
Table 4: Overall statistics  
Scenario Accuracy Too conservative Too optimistic 
(A) Unknowns left as is 83.25% 9.05% 7.70% 
(B) Unknowns as initial state 83.77% 8.64% 7.59% 
(C) Unknowns as last known state 83.81% 8.68% 7.51% 
 
Overall, the results show that the model is able to predict quite accurately, achieving 
an accuracy percentage of around 83% (cf. Table 4), but this high accuracy 
percentage figure is probably due to the high accuracy for predictions in state 0, and 
closer inspection of predictions for accounts that were initially in states 1 and 2 at the 
beginning of the test periods are very poor.  Although we do not have the relevant 
costs for each type of wrong prediction, the cost associated with a default wrongly 
predicted to be a recovery is expected to be greater than the cost associated with a 
recovery wrongly predicted to be a default.  From Table 4, we see that the model does 
give conservative predictions, as a larger percentage of accounts are predicted to be in 
a worse state than they are.  For example, from Table 3, panel A, 78% of accounts that 
were predicted to be in state 3 were actually in state 0, whereas 0.1% of accounts that 
were predicted to be in state 0 were actually in state 3.  The cost of misclassifying each 
of the former accounts is greater than that of misclassifying each of the latter accounts.  
Thus the model’s predictions over a 12 month horizon overestimated the costs of 
misclassifying accounts rather than underestimated them.  Notice also that the model 
appears robust as it gives similar results across the different scenarios.    
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5. Conclusions 
 
Based on a large dataset of credit card loans, we developed a set of semi-parametric 
multiplicative intensity models to predict delinquency.  These models, which are based 
on survival models, are able to incorporate time-dependent variables, and are able to 
predict not just whether an event will occur, but also give probabilities of when it might 
occur, thus providing a more dynamic framework for prediction.  It is the first time these 
models are being applied to retail loans, and we were able to achieve two main 
research outcomes in this work.   
 
First, interesting insights into the factors that affect movements towards (and recovery 
from) delinquency were made.  By keeping the covariates unchanged for the different 
types of transitions, we were able to compare the effects of each covariate on the 
different transitions.  We found that most application variables affect risk of 
delinquency similarly to what was previously established (based on credit scoring or 
behavioural models), but also that some groups of people are better in keeping 
themselves only in delinquency without tipping over to default.  In particular, the self-
employed and unemployed are at higher risk of going into delinquency as compared to 
those employed; but once in delinquency, the employed seem less able to recover and 
avoid the state of default.  This phenomenon was again seen in one of the time-
dependent behavioural variables, where we observed that those who frequently go into 
delinquency are more likely to go into delinquency again but not default.  We theorised 
that debtors who are self-employed or unemployed are better at balancing their 
accounts, and thus more able to stay out of default, whereas those who are employed 
enjoy a stable income and thus are less successful at keeping out of default when 
confronted with an unexpected break in their income.  The baseline intensities 
computed were also intuitive for all transitions.   
 
Secondly, the model was used for predictions in two parts, one to gain insights based 
on employment type, and the other to validate the model.  In the first part, a typical 
account for each employment type was created and the matrix of transition 
probabilities was computed for time 6 to 12 months after the account was opened.  We 
found that the model produced plausible and intuitive results, where in general, 
accounts that were non-delinquent at time 6 are very likely to remain non-delinquent at 
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the end of month 12, but did have a small chance of going into one of the different 
states of delinquency; and how delinquent the debtor was at time 6 would affect his 
chance of recovery, further delinquency or default.  We observe that debtors of 
different employment types behaved differently when in different states.  In particular, 
while in delinquency, debtors who are self-employed or unemployed seemed more 
adept at keeping themselves only in arrears without tipping over into default. 
 
In the second part, we applied the intensity models to all observations in the test set at 
time 6 months into the start of the account and, using an algorithm and different cut-off 
values for different transitions, predicted for the state of each observation at time 12 
months.  Three different scenarios were considered for the handling of accounts that 
were censored before the end of the observation period.  From these predictions, we 
found that the model made fairly accurate predictions on an overall level, but was not 
able to do as well on the account level.  The total number of accounts predicted to be 
in each state at the end of the respective test periods were reasonably close to what 
was observed, but while the model was able to predict for transitions, it did not seem 
able to predict the correct accounts transit.  Overall, we found that the model is adept 
at predicting between delinquent and non-delinquent accounts as a high percentage of 
accounts were correctly predicted to be in state 0 at time 12; but did not do as well 
when predicting between delinquent states, i.e. states 1, 2 and 3.  When the model got 
it wrong, it erred on the conservative side, by predicting the account to be in a state 
lower than it should be, than liberal, which is expected to have a lower cost 
consequence.   
 
We believe there is more research to be done in this area, especially since this is the 
first time intensity models are being applied to retail loans.  One obvious addition to the 
model is time-dependent macroeconomic variables.  While it is true that all debtors will 
be affected by changes in the economy, it is likely that different groups of debtors are 
affected to a variety of extents.  An extension of this work would be to include some 
interaction terms between macroeconomic variables and some of the application 
covariates, as well as applying the model on more recent data, which could hopefully 
encompass the credit crisis of 2008.  Another area of further work would be the way 
the probabilities of the model are translated into predicted events.  Right now an 
algorithm involving cut-off values is used, and comparison of probabilities and cut-off 
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values is based on a particular specified order of states, and this implicitly increases 
the likelihood of transition into one state over another.  Further research would be to 
experiment with different cut-off values, or possibly a different method of predicting for 
transition.    
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